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Missing in Action: 
Embodied Experience and Virtual Reality
Sita Popat
Introduction
Theatre has always been a space of virtuality. The action on the stage exists as neither 
what it is actually nor what it is pretending to be; instead, it bridges the actual and the 
imaginary to create a virtual world in which performers and viewers are complicit. 
During the twentieth century, as design and projection technologies advanced, theatre 
developed even greater potential as a place of imagination unfettered by physical re-
strictions. Two- and three-dimensional images can now represent people, environments, 
and objects interacting and interlacing with the action onstage, or even replacing the 
stage altogether. As a researcher working with human bodies and digital avatars, my 
interest has been piqued by the recent surge in the desire of audiences to enter the 
performance space in immersive theatre, coupled with the emergence of virtual reality 
(VR) headsets into the regular commercial and home entertainment markets.1 These 
two phenomena are already colliding in productions like Noma Labs’ recent Virtually 
Dead (2016) in which participants are taken to a “training facility” to learn how to 
kill zombies in VR, only to find that the real zombies are coming to get them.2 What 
might this new era of VR offer to theatre in the future? Immersive theatre takes the 
participant into the action, but that action is still limited by the physicality of settings 
and performers. In VR anything can be done because it is all in the mind—isn’t it?
Since its early days, VR has been beleaguered by claims that it has a disembodying 
effect, with popular culture often following the pattern of William Gibson’s seminal 
writings, suggesting that the body will become obsolete.3 Much research in VR was 
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1 Originally, the word avatar described the physical form taken by a Hindu god to enable him or her 
to appear to earthly beings. These forms often included a swan, a deer, or a person. It is now used as 
the term for any virtual body or object that represents the participant or user in the virtual world. So 
in practical terms, it “stands in for” the user in the virtual world.
2 See Noma Labs’s Virtually Dead website at http://virtuallydead.co.uk/. This performance installation 
was first shown in London in March 2016.
3 See William Gibson, Neuromancer (New York: Ace, 1984). Neuromancer was Gibson’s most influential 
book, in which he coined the term cyberspace. He published numerous other science fiction stories of 
a similar style.
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carried out in the 1980s and ’90s with head-mounted display (HMD) units enabling full 
immersion, often incorporating data-gloves and other haptic interfaces to enable the 
user to “touch” virtual objects.4 Scientists examined perceptions of location and pres-
ence in virtual worlds, but there was surprisingly little investigation of the embodied 
experience of the participant.5 Susan Kozel’s early writings on the phenomenology 
of dance and new technologies during the 1990s stand out as some of the few works 
in the territory at that time.6 This was due at least in part to the fact that these early 
HMDs were expensive, heavy, and cumbersome, with trailing wires and cables that 
limited freedom of movement.7 Between the late 1990s and the early 2010s, interest in 
VR waned in favor of “mixed reality” in digital arts and performance, where virtual 
and physical elements combine within the artwork or environment. However, con-
temporary production of relatively low-cost, lightweight HMD units or headsets with 
limited wiring opens up the potential for immersive VR to emerge into wider usage, 
including the arts and home computer games. The HMDs on the market currently range 
from relatively costly full-system headsets like Oculus Rift or HTC Vive that require 
powerful computers to run high-quality VR experiences to cheap Google Cardboard 
or equivalent systems that strap your smartphone into a headset as the source of 
computing power.8 In many cases, headphones can be plugged into the system and 
worn over the headset to provide some level of surround sound, although the sound 
quality tends to scale with the price. All of the headsets are fitted using a strap around 
the back of the head, and some of them include a strap over the top of the head (fig. 
1). The effect for the wearer is that she is inside the virtual world, able to look in any 
direction around, above, below, or behind her as if she was “really there.”
Writer and producer Jason Ferguson claimed recently that “virtual reality has a sto-
rytelling problem and theater will save it.”9 He explained that the problem is caused 
by first-person delivery modes, which tend to struggle with linear narratives. Indeed, 
VR and immersive theatre can assist each other in the storytelling process. In Virtually 
Dead the VR element of the production is a zombie-shooting game in which zombies 
attack you from every angle out of the dark, creating a sense of pleasurable anxiety akin 
to being inside a horror movie, which enhances the framing narrative provided by the 
immersive theatre element.10 However, VR is not necessarily a storytelling medium, and 
often it is essentially an experiential medium. While these new technologies are still 
at an early stage of development, with Oculus Rift launched in April 2016 and HTC 
Vive a month later, it seems that the primary market is likely to be in the provision of 
“experiences” for users, much like the “holodeck” in the television and film world of 
4 For a brief history of VR in performance, see Steve Dixon, Digital Performance: A History of New Media 
in Theater, Dance, Performance Art, and Installation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 363–67; see also 
Oliver Grau, Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
5 See the research by Mel Slater and his team in the early 1990s at the Department of Computer Sci-
ence and London Parallel Applications Centre, University of London.
6 Susan Kozel, Closer: Performance, Technologies, Phenomenology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007).
7 Edward Castronova, Synthetic Worlds: The Business and Culture of Online Games (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2005), 285–94.
8 See Oculus Rift’s website at https://www.oculus.com/en-us/; HTC Vive’s at https://www.htcvive.com/uk/; 
and Google Cardboard’s at https://vr.google.com/cardboard/.
9 Jason Ferguson, “Virtual Reality Has a Storytelling Problem and Theater Will Save It,” UploadVR, 
May 8, 2016, available at http://uploadvr.com/virtual-reality-storytelling-problem-theater-will-save/.
10 Sharan Matharu, “Virtually Dead,” Hodderscape, March 21, 2016, available at http://www.hodderscape.
co.uk/virtually-dead/.
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Star Trek. What would it be like to be onstage with Madonna, or in a haunted house, 
or on planet Mars, or in a battle zone? With VR, even more than with theatre alone, we 
can be anywhere and do anything—the possibilities for theatre are seemingly limitless.
In the first monograph on the subject, in 2012, Josephine Machon suggests that the 
rise in popularity of immersive theatre is representative of a desire for real-world, 
interpersonal communication in physical space, in direct rebellion against the dis-
embodied, distancing effect of VR, social media, and online existence.11 I will argue, 
on the contrary, that this emphasis on experiences and interactions in, and with, VR 
environments can enable us to relocate ourselves as embodied beings rather than 
distancing us from our bodies. These environments allow us to ask questions about 
embodiment and humanity through the experiences of our individual bodies in a way 
that has never been possible before. The nature of action in virtual worlds is such that 
our bodies are both present and absent, experiencing agency and aspects of sensation 
even though there is no direct contact between flesh and world. How do we approach 
the nature of embodied experience in VR when anything can be done, but the body is 
apparently missing? It becomes possible to explore impossible situations and experi-
ences through the eyes of others. We can begin to learn what it might feel like to be 
blind, as in Arnaud Colinart’s art installation Notes on Blindness: Into Darkness (2016) 
where the participant sees blackness with fleeting outline images appearing only when 
Figure 1. The author using a VR headset with smartphone and headphones.
11 Josephine Machon, Immersive Theatres: Intimacy and Immediacy in Contemporary Performance (Basing-
stoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 26.
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sounds are heard.12 Or we might feel something of the terror of a family of refugees as 
the participant accompanies them in their flight across the sea, as in Daniel Efergan’s 
We Wait (2016).13 The new field of immersive journalism can provide a VR perspective 
on human experience in relation to news stories, such as Nonny de la Peña’s Project 
Syria (2016), which places the participant alongside frightened children in war-torn 
Syria.14 These examples can only give us shades of the genuine experiences that they 
portray, but for reasons I will explain, they enable us to feel more at an embodied level 
of the experience of “being there” than television or theatre can offer.
Yet, is it ethically defensible to engage in any experience or action that would not 
be viable or perhaps condoned in the physical world on the basis that it is not “real”? 
What if that experience is of the sexual abuse and murder of a virtual child, as in Jen-
nifer Hayley’s play The Nether?15 Even within the play’s storyline, the event did not 
“truly” happen and no child was involved, but the adults experienced the sex and 
violence even though their bodies were technically removed from the action. The image 
interposes itself between the physical Other and the participant. This begins to raise 
questions about how we understand the virtual Other. In We Wait and Notes on Blind-
ness the participant is called on to empathize with the human experience of the Other, 
but how far is the virtual Other related to the physical Other at an embodied level? 
By the middle of the present century, will we be uploading our consciousnesses into 
cyberspace and leaving our obsolete bodies, or “meat,” behind us, or will embodied 
experience connect us across physical and virtual worlds?
In the following pages I examine the nature of embodied experience in VR, both in 
one-to-one engagements with virtual worlds and in telematic interactions with other 
people (remotely located while being projected into a shared virtual environment). I will 
argue that bodies within these contexts may be experienced simultaneously as absent 
and present, together and separate. This area is still under-researched in the fields of 
computing, new media, and communications, but it is essential for theatre and perfor-
mance to understand if we are to approach VR effectively and ethically in artworks. 
The essay begins by exploring the differences between screen-based VR and the use 
of a HMD unit or headset. The proprioceptive senses are exposed as playing a crucial 
role in grounding experience within a body experienced as “missing.” These senses 
include internal connectivity, spatiality, and movement, enabling me, for example, to 
know the position of my arms without being able to see them. The argument moves on 
to encompass the nature of perception and presence in VR environments, referencing 
visual and embodied sensation and bodily memory. Touch is identified as a contributing 
factor in the establishment of presence, yet it is the action involved in reaching out to 
touch rather than in the achievement of contact that provides the constituting effect. 
As a result of these various modes of engagement, the body in VR is experienced as 
blurred, being both virtual and physical, absent and present, compounded and indivis-
ible, even though body and environment have different materialities. This duality may 
cause confusion in the ethics of embodiment governing physical interactions between 
12 See http://www.arte.tv/notes-on-blindness.
13 See http://www.aardman.com/aardman-and-bbc-rd-launch-interactive-vr-experience-we-wait/.
14 See http://www.immersivejournalism.com/ for more information.
15 Jennifer Hayley, The Nether (London: Faber and Faber, 2014). The play premiered in 2013 in Los 
Angeles; for further information, see http://www.thenetherplay.com/. See also Sarah Bay-Cheng, “Virtual 
Realisms: Dramatic Forays into the Future,” Theatre Journal 67, no. 4 (2015): 689–93.
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audience and performer—when, and if, to touch or be touched, for example—since the 
blurred body confounds cognitive separation between the physical and virtual. Such 
confusion can result in a mismatch between the embodied self and disembodied Other 
that the gaming world is poorly equipped to negotiate, but that could have profound 
effects on VR users. Theatre, on the other hand, is well-versed in the negotiation of the 
real and the virtual, and as such it can offer a place to explore relationships between 
embodied experience and ethical engagement in virtual worlds.
I will refer to a number of VR and telematic performances, but my argument draws 
particularly on my experiences of Gibson/Martelli’s White Island (2014). In this per-
formance installation, I donned an Oculus Rift headset and drifted alone in a virtual 
hot-air balloon over a representation of the Arctic landscape. I was surprised at the 
intensity of the embodied experience in which my body was disrupted, conflicted, 
and confused. I cowered, muscles tensed and body folded inward protectively, as I 
hurtled on a collision course toward a vast virtual mountainside. And yet, glancing 
toward where my senses were screaming that my body should be, I saw nothing. My 
body was, I will argue, “missing in action.” In that moment my embodied self knew 
that my arms were raised in front of my face, but my empirical perspective on the 
world presented visual evidence that my arms were not there. Two different ways of 
knowing the world collided as I crashed into the cliff face.
Experiencing White Island
White Island was created by Ruth Gibson, a dancer and somatic-movement practi-
tioner, and Bruno Martelli, a digital artist and programmer. The performance instal-
lation incorporates an Oculus Rift headset to take the participant on a journey in a 
hot-air balloon over the Arctic Circle.16 The installation was inspired by the doomed 
Arctic exploration trip led by Salomon August Andrée in 1897. Andrée and two fel-
low explorers attempted to navigate a specially designed balloon over the ice to the 
North Pole, but misfortune resulted in a crash and the eventual loss of the lives of all 
three explorers. Their story was discovered in 1930 when their bodies were found on 
Kvitøya (White Island), preserved by the cold, along with expedition documentation 
in the form of diaries and photographs. The isolation of the hot-air balloon flight over 
the forbidding Arctic landscape seems closely echoed in the design of White Island as 
a VR experience in which the participant drifts completely alone in an alien virtual 
world. The participant is suspended in a hot-air balloon basket over a vast expanse 
of icy rivers and snowy mountains, driven and buffeted by the northern gales. The 
following discussion draws on a thick description of my experiences of this installa-
tion written on the next day, notes taken while observing my student Eleanor Gribbin 
participating in the installation, and a record of my discussion with Gribbin afterwards.
In July 2014, at the Coleman Project Space in East London, Martelli showed us into 
a small, dark room, the walls hung with heavy black cloth. A thick, rough rope was 
stretched vertically floor-to-ceiling, attached at the base to a stage weight and at the top 
to a metal rig. Next to the rope was an Oculus Rift headset, dangling by a wire from the 
overhead rig. He told us that we could tug down on the rope to gain height and pull 
up to lose height. I put on the headset and found myself in a hot-air balloon, floating 
16 See Ruth Gibson and Bruno Martelli’s White Island website, available at http://gibsonmartelli.com/
WhiteIsland.html.
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over the icy terrain. Snowflakes were blowing past as I hung suspended in the dark 
basket with the handrail encircling me at about the level of my waist (fig. 2). Looking 
upwards I saw the large balloon with dark sails jutting out of either side. There were 
black ropes running vertically between the basket and the balloon. My hand was still 
gripping the physical rope, which helped me to balance as I looked around. Below the 
basket were white hillsides, glaciers, and valleys, with occasional dark rivers snaking 
their way along the clefts. At times the basket drifted out over the dark sea edged 
with broken ice floes. The howling wind heard on the low soundtrack playing in the 
room was accompanied by horizontal snowflakes flying past my face, and the basket 
traveled in a relentless motion that could change quite suddenly with the vagaries of 
the wind. I tugged and hauled on the physical rope to go upwards, lifting the basket 
so that it scraped over hills, and downwards, dropping into vales to make out smaller 
features of the landscape. I discovered later that I had some control over the direction 
by pulling sideways on the rope to direct the sails on the balloon, but I did not realize 
this at the time, which added to the feeling of isolation and helplessness in the harsh, 
monochrome environment.
The three-dimensional VR of the Oculus Rift headset immersed me in the experi-
ence as I turned and observed the world around me and looked up at the balloon. 
I felt slightly disorientated when I glanced toward the places where I could feel my 
hand on the rope and my feet on the floor, but I saw nothing except the basket, ropes, 
and driving snow. I looked ahead to see the side of a huge mountain looming out of 
the storm, and I decided, as one does in virtual worlds, to see what would happen 
if I let the balloon crash into it. The basket careened toward the white slopes, which 
filled my field of vision. I cowered away instinctively, raising my arms to my head 
for protection. I felt my arms brush my face, but saw nothing come between my eyes 
and the enormous rock face. I shut my eyes, and the reassuring visible bulk of my 
physicality was restored by the dark of my eyelids as I heard a crashing boom on the 
soundtrack that seemed to reverberate dully through my body. Opening my eyes, I saw 
the landscape flashing with pale color and then returning to monochrome as somehow 
the balloon skimmed over the top of the mountain and returned to its endless journey.
Watching Gribbin taking her turn in the installation, I noticed the same instinctive 
physical bracing prior to a crash and the same involuntary gesture of lifting her arms 
to her head. At other times, like me, she reached out a hand in an attempt to grasp 
the basket’s handrail in front of her and pawed at the air—an invisible physical hand 
attempting unsuccessfully to locate the visible virtual rail. Occasionally, Gribbin chose 
to let go of the physical rope, but she was unable to move out of the virtual basket 
because the headset tethered her to the overhead grid and prevented stepping beyond 
that small space. Then her hand sought about for the rope again until it relocated 
her in the invisible physical world once more. I saw from her gestures that she was 
experiencing the same confusion as I had felt and we spoke afterwards about it. Our 
bodies were missing, but we could feel the actions we were doing and experienced 
physical responses to the visible (virtual) world. How were physical and virtual reali-
ties interacting in our experiences, and where were our bodies?
Eyes in the Front of My Head
One of the reasons why the participant’s body appears to be missing in White Island 
is the absence of any form of avatar or representational image of the body in the virtual 
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world. In situations where the avatar is encountered via a separate screen in front of 
the participant, for example, a desktop computer game, I have previously proposed the 
Husserlian “nullpoint” as a way of modeling how the participant’s visual perception 
of the virtual world maps to the avatar’s “eyes” through the screen interface.17 The 
first theorist to introduce phenomenological methods to philosophy, Edmund Husserl 
argued at the start of the twentieth century that the eyes were the place from which 
the perceptual field radiated and thus they were a visual nullpoint in themselves. One 
cannot look at one’s own eyes (without using a mirror) because they are the organs of 
seeing; thus they might be perceived as connecting the interior of the perceiver’s body 
with that which is exterior. Husserl’s thinking was grounded in nineteenth-century 
observational empiricism based on the five then-recognized senses (sight, smell, hearing, 
touch, and taste) and reliant upon a subject/object binary in the sense of inside/outside 
the body. Inevitably, it carries an inherent sense of dualism that is at odds with more 
contemporary perspectives on the body, such as those of philosopher Mark Johnson 
and neurologist Antonio Damasio.18 However, this dualism is useful when consider-
ing the human/avatar relationship. Indeed, Husserl’s visual nullpoint seems to serve 
particularly well when the participant is working with/through a first-person avatar, 
where the perspective displayed onscreen represents vision through the avatar’s eyes.
This perspective was the case in most performance installations using VR before the 
advent of contemporary headsets. For example, in Blast Theory’s Desert Rain (1999), 
six participants entered a virtual world projected onto a screen of falling water to 
explore a desert war environment.19 Standing on a footplate control mechanism and 
17 Sita Popat, “Keeping It Real: Encountering Mixed Reality in igloo’s SwanQuake: House,” Convergence: 
The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 18, no. 1 (2011): 11–16.
18 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Antonio 
Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1999).
19 For further information, see http://www.blasttheory.co.uk/projects/desert-rain/.
Figure 2. Ruth Gibson and Bruno Martelli’s White Island (2013). The hot-air balloon basket’s handrail 
circles the participant at approximately waist height. (Photo: Copyright © Ruth Gibson and Bruno 
Martelli, reprinted with permission.)
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screened off from one another inside cubicles, they each navigated buildings and desert 
terrains on the water screen in front them to achieve a given task. There is quite liter-
ally a separation between body and environment at the interface of the screen in this 
installation and others like it, with interior/exterior translating readily as flesh/digital 
world. This separation is further underscored by the mismatch between the avatar’s 
movement in the virtual world and its control by the physical body. In Desert Rain 
the participants had thirty minutes in which to experience the virtual world, so a key 
aspect of the design had to be an intuitive control mechanism that could be learned 
quickly. The standard computer-game keyboard controls (for example, pressing “W” 
to move forward) can take a while for people to learn, although once learned, these 
controls tend to recede from conscious awareness. There was insufficient time for such 
a learning process in Desert Rain, so instead the team created a footplate that could 
be tilted by shifts in the participant’s body weight, which controlled the perspective 
on the virtual world and moved it in the direction of tilt. This was a more direct 
relationship between the movement of the participant and that of the avatar than 
pressing the “W” key, but there was still a clear separation. In both Desert Rain and 
computer gaming, the participant/player’s bodily experience becomes linked to the 
avatar through the realization of her physical movement in the actions of the avatar 
in the virtual world. This loop—the intention to act, the physicalization of that action, 
and feedback that the avatar has realized the action—creates a connecting membrane 
between the participant’s body and the onscreen avatar. The participant/player may 
claim the actions of the avatar as her own, even though those actions may not map 
directly to her own physical movements.
In performance studies theory, Richard Schechner has proposed that initially the actor 
experiences herself as “me,” and the character she will represent onstage as “not-me.” 
However, through the process of rehearsal there is a level of synthesis that results in 
the actor perceiving her own stage persona as that character being “not-not-me.”20 
This modeling can also apply to the participant/player and avatar, where the avatar 
becomes the “not-not-me” by which I gain presence in the virtual world. In Desert Rain 
the bodily mapping was simple and could be learned quickly, enabling the participant 
to connect with her avatar to navigate the virtual desert within the installation. More 
complex mapping takes time, as is usually the case in computer games. Media scholar 
Jaime Banks has carried out extensive research into the relationships between players 
and avatars in online games. She noted that extended time playing with one avatar 
often leads to the establishment of deeply embodied connections between player and 
avatar. These connections can result in players perceiving their avatars as an extension 
of themselves, by which they inhabit the virtual environment.21
White Island offers a different kind of experience from either Desert Rain or computer 
gaming. The Oculus Rift headset provides the participant with the visual impression of 
being physically located within the virtual environment. When the participant turns or 
looks up or down, she sees the virtual environment all around her. The body and the 
avatar appear to inhabit the same space because their eyes/perspectives occupy the 
same nullpoint and thus coincide spatially. The headset presents a three-dimensional 
20 Richard Schechner, cited in Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play 
(New York: PAJ Publications, 1982), 120–21.
21 Jaime Banks, “Object, Me, Symbiote, Other: A Social Typology of Player–Avatar Relationships,” 
First Monday 20, no. 2 (2015), available at http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/5433.
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stereoscopic image on two screens directly in front of the participant’s eyes, which 
results in visual perception similar to the way the eyes and brain perceive the physi-
cal world. This impression is underscored by the way in which the movement of the 
participant’s head and body is reflected in the perspective displayed on the screens, 
which adjusts her view of the virtual world to match her positioning in a manner that 
corresponds to physical-world expectations.22 In White Island, without an avatar to rep-
resent my body, I see, but I cannot be seen even by my own eyes. Instead, I experience 
a kind of missing or phantom body that exists only proprioceptively, perhaps similar 
to the sensation of a phantom limb that is sometimes experienced by amputees.23 
Neurophysiologist Oliver Sacks explains that the term proprioception was first coined 
in the 1890s by a doctor named Charles Scott Sherrington, who referred to it as “our 
secret sense, our sixth sense.”24 Sacks describes it as “that continuous but unconscious 
sensory flow from the movable parts of our body (muscles, tendons, joints), by which 
their position and tone and motion is continually monitored and adjusted, but in a 
way which is hidden from us because it is automatic and unconscious.”25 This “sixth 
sense,” encompassing internal connectivity, spatiality, and movement, was a late ad-
dition to the five primarily externally facing senses on which empiricism was based, 
bringing with it new ways of knowing (in) the world.
Writing over a century ago, Sherrington considered proprioception as indispensable 
for “our sense of ourselves” and named it after its importance in defining the “body 
proper” to (or owned by) the self.26 My own physicality was strongly present in White 
Island, as my proprioceptive senses felt the interconnectivity and movement of my 
muscles, tendons, and joints. Yet, the absence of an avatar onto which I could map these 
sensations created a focus on bodily interiority that seemed fundamentally at odds 
with the emphasis on visual representations of the body in most screen-based virtual 
environments.27 It felt particularly out of kilter against the relatively naturalistic repre-
sentations of the Arctic ice floes and the hot-air balloon, which simulated a “normal” 
physical relationship with the world in other respects. My body was highlighted by its 
visual absence, causing me to pay particular attention to my internal senses in order to 
locate myself in the virtual environment. The notion of avatar becomes obsolete in White 
Island, and with it the Husserlian nullpoint, because there is no direct representation of 
the body; there is no sense of “not-not-me,” but just “me,” breathing, moving, feeling. 
The experiential absence-presence of my body in that space simultaneously identified 
my proprioceptive senses as defining my physicality and highlighted the awareness 
of my whole bodily interface with the virtual world. The visual absence of my body, 
missing as object, focused all of my attention on my action as subject. The narrative 
of White Island is an internal one; nothing happens on the journey apart from my own 
navigation through the virtual world. I am performer and spectator conjoined, and the 
22 Mel Slater, “Place Illusion and Plausibility Can Lead to Realistic Behaviour in Immersive Virtual 
Environments,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364 (2009): 3549–57.
23 The author is currently leading a research project funded by the Wellcome Trust to investigate 
this comparison further.
24 Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales (1985; reprint, London: 
Picador Pan Macmillan, 2015), 47.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. (emphasis in original).
27 See avatar body-design systems in Second Life (http://secondlife.com/) and World of Warcraft (eu.battle.
net/World-of-Warcraft).
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performance takes place in my missing, yet acting body. The performance is one-on-one 
in the most extreme fashion, as I perform my own embodied subjectivity for myself.
Visual and Proprioceptive Perception
There was a marked contrast between my experiences of body and world in White 
Island. My body I felt somatically, internally, as a subject with no objective visual 
perception of it externally. Conversely, I experienced the virtual representation of the 
Arctic world visually, apart from the rough physical rope in my hand, which I asso-
ciated vaguely with the vertical ropes of the hot-air balloon. Coming from the dual 
perspectives of dance and philosophy, Deirdre Sklar contrasts visual and propriocep-
tive perceptions:
Seeing implies an object, something to see. And in order to see an object, one must be 
separate from it, at enough distance to bring it into focus. . . . The objectification implicit in 
seeing is associated with the objectivity of the mind, while the somatic sensation implicit in 
touch is associated with nearness and the subjectivity of proprioception. Kinesthesia, even 
more proprioceptive than touch, has been entirely omitted from the western sensorium.28
In dominant Western modes of knowledge—for example, rationalism and empiri-
cism—the distance of objectivity is an essential element of knowing the world. In White 
Island everything is distanced, except the hot-air balloon itself, by the height at which 
one travels over the landscape. Yet, the objectivity of that distance is challenged by 
the nature of the representation. The landscape is unknowable in its immeasurability, 
uninhabited, often partially obscured by snowflakes, sometimes glitching, flickering, 
or shifting between low and high resolution, passing below the basket on its never-
ending journey. This is not the distance of objectivity from which one can contemplate 
and observe; instead, it functions as a visual, alien counterfoil to the immediate and 
constant subjectivity of the proprioceptive senses by which I experience being in this 
installation. The limitations of language, with its separatist consequences, force me to 
describe my body as if it were an object that belonged to “me” (which Sherrington’s 
early definition of proprioception also implied). Yet, as Sklar indicates, it is partly the 
ability to see the body that leads to this objectification, since the body can be observed 
as if from the outside via the eyes (returning us to Husserl’s nullpoint). Sacks explains 
that our proprioceptive senses do not require any conscious attention and continue to 
define our being, regardless of anything else that we might be thinking or doing. If 
visual perception of the body is missing, then the only immediate awareness of physical 
being is via the proprioceptive senses (including touch), and thus those senses tend to 
be foregrounded where normally they might recede from conscious attention.29
Critical to the experience of bodily presence is the perception of the space in which 
the body exists, as it is intimately connected to the kinesthetic sense of being a moving 
body in space. In VR the space exists virtually, so how can it be perceived as being 
inhabited? Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, an anthropologist with a strong interest in move-
ment, critiques Merleau-Ponty’s examination of George Stratton’s experiments with 
inverted vision to highlight the body’s role in spatial perception. Stratton’s researchers 
28 Deirdre Sklar, “Remembering Kinesthesia: An Inquiry into Embodied Cultural Knowledge,” in 
Migrations of Gesture, ed. Carrie Noland and Sally Ann Ness (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2008), 87.
29 See Drew Leder, The Absent Body (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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put on glasses that inverted their vision, but after a few days their brains re-inverted 
the images so that everything appeared normal to them again. Merleau-Ponty proposed 
this as evidence that space is essentially visually constructed, and that understandings 
of spatial concepts may be achieved through the disruption or distortion of normal 
modes of perception.30 This approach would seem to be effective for VR, as it is seen 
through the eyes as an image. Sheets-Johnstone points out, however, that it was bodily 
experience that caused Stratton’s researchers’ brains to correct the visual anomaly. 
While it is possible to invert vision and thus temporarily confuse spatial orientation, it 
is not possible to undertake such an inversion of proprioceptive perception, and there-
fore the brain re-inverts the images to match the body’s experience. She explains that 
“the tactile-kinesthetic body cannot be fooled. . . . Space at its source is a corporeal space 
defined by the intrinsic spatiality of animate form and the inherent spatial possibilities of the 
tactile-kinesthetic body.”31 This fundamental corporeal space arising from proprioceptive 
sensation is the basis by which I inhabit the virtual environment, whether an avatar 
is visible or not. In the virtual hot-air balloon basket, I perceived the physical rope in 
my hand and the occasional tug on my head from the cable connecting the headset to 
the overhead rig if I attempted to move beyond the space of the basket. However, the 
greater portion of my spatial-locative experience came from my proprioceptive senses, 
and those senses gave me presence in the virtual environment because my body was 
moving in the world. My body always knows where I am in corporeal space, and I 
make cognitive sense of that corporeal space in relation to the world that I see around 
me, folding physical and virtual together rather than experiencing a binary division. 
My body cannot be missing because my corporeal space is “here,” engaging in action.
The Doing of Action
The argument for the primacy of proprioception and corporeal space suggests that VR 
might coincide with the physical environment, but that it should have limited power 
for transcendence because the body “cannot be fooled.” Yet, I cowered instinctively 
away from the crash into a virtual mountainside in White Island, aware of a small rush 
of adrenalin coursing through my body even though I knew the mountain did not exist.
Mel Slater has been researching the experience of presence in VR since the early 
1990s.32 He and his colleagues have noted that people in immersive VR environments 
“tend to respond realistically to virtual situations and events even though they know 
that these are not real.”33 This “response-as-if-real” remains constant even if the visual 
representation is “severely reduced” in terms of verisimilitude, resolution, physics, and 
so forth. Slater’s explanation is that this is related to “place illusion” and “the brain’s 
high degree of plasticity in the representation of the body.”34 He describes “place il-
30 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge / 
Kegan Paul, 1962), 246.
31 Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Roots of Thinking (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 
286–87 (emphasis in original).
32 Mel Slater, Daniel Perez-Marcos, H. Henrik Ehrsson, and Maria V. Sanchez-Vives, “Inducing Illusory 
Ownership of a Virtual Body,” Frontiers in Neuroscience 3, no. 2 (2009): 214–20.
33 Nonny de la Peña et al., “Immersive Journalism: Immersive Virtual Reality for the First-Person 
Experience of News,” Presence 19, no. 4 (2010): 291–301, quote on 293.
34 Ibid., 294.
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lusion” as being a “strong illusion of being in a place in spite of the sure knowledge 
that you are not there.”35 He claims that this experience of place is further enhanced by 
the “plausibility illusion,” which is brought about by the direct relationship between 
the participant’s physical movement and the uncontrolled, yet direct responses of the 
virtual world. For example, as the participant moves her head, her perspective on 
the world adjusts accordingly. Movement is fundamental to this illusion, as it is only 
by moving the head that the correlating response of the virtual environment can be 
mapped and evaluated against the physical experience of moving. Thus propriocep-
tive sensation corresponds to visual representation, confirming the user’s corporeal 
space as being consistent with having presence in the virtual world. This correlation 
is sufficient to establish the plausibility of presence in VR and thus to engage the user 
in the dramatic illusion as if it were real. Where then might the theatre-maker take the 
participant, if the correlation between corporeal space and dramatic world can place 
her at the heart of the experience?
Immersed in the installation, the place and plausibility illusions felt strong to Gribbin 
and me as we traveled, each alone, in the hot-air balloon. We knew conceptually that 
it was an illusion, but the physical and the virtual were conflated in our embodied 
responses to the environment. I raised my arms before my face for protection from 
the oncoming crash against the white cliff face, as adrenalin flowed and my muscles 
braced for impact. While cognitively I was aware that the impact would not affect me 
physically, my body only partially acknowledged that fact. The adrenalin rush was 
nowhere near as overwhelming as if I had believed myself genuinely about to crash 
into a mountainside, but it was still noticeably present in my system. Yet, my raised 
arms did not come into view and block my field of vision as subconsciously I expected 
them to do. Their proprioceptive presence combined with their visual absence to disrupt 
the plausibility of the illusion, emphasizing the relationship between my fleshy body 
and the digital environment. My body was in action, but the lack of a visible avatar 
meant that it was still apparently missing, thus drawing attention not so much to the 
act of doing as to the doing of action—action missing a perceivable bodily outcome and 
yet re-found in a corporeal sense: absent-present.36 I could undertake actions in that 
environment and it could respond to my positioning in a recognizable manner to give 
me a sense of reality, but my decision to crash into the mountainside demonstrates my 
absolute cognitive belief that I was not in physical danger, even though my embodied 
reactions were not so readily reductive.
I knew that this was a constructed environment, and that this particular instantia-
tion of it was for me, and me alone, to explore and experience. In 1977 psychologist 
James Gibson introduced the idea of “affordances” when considering the relationship 
between animal and environment in terms of perception.37 Bearing some striking re-
semblances to the earlier work of Henri Bergson, Gibson’s theory was that the animal 
perceives the environment in relation to the affordances for particular actions that the 
environment offers to that animal. These affordances result from the combination of 
animal and environment rather than being specific to one or the other. For example, 
35 Slater, “Place Illusion and Plausibility,” 3551.
36 White Island’s creators, Gibson and Martelli, often design elements into their works that disrupt 
immersive experience in order to make the participant engage critically with it. See the interview with 
them in Jonathan Pitches and Sita Popat, Performance Perspectives: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke, 
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 126–31.
37 James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New York: Psychology Press, 1986).
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a mouse being chased by a cat might perceive a small hole in the skirting board as 
offering the affordance of a hiding place, whereas the cat would not perceive the same 
affordance because it would not fit into the hole and would not need a hiding place if 
no other predators were present. Gibson explains that “[n]o animal can exist without 
an environment surrounding it. Equally, although not so obvious, an environment 
implies an animal (or at least an organism) to be surrounded.”38 Evolving slightly 
after the philosophical idea of phenomenology though out of similar sociocultural 
trends, Gibson’s theory applies to all animals, including humans. The environment is 
defined by the presence of a living being, and it is perceived by that being in relation 
to what it/she/he might need or want to do there. For him, it is the potential for the 
doing of action that defines the environment. As such, it seems to apply remarkably 
effectively to VR, where the environment has been designed and created solely for 
humans to do actions in it.
Bergson had reached similar conclusions some six decades earlier in Matter and 
Memory, writing that “[m]y body, an object destined to move other objects, is, then, 
a centre of action.”39 He described how the world could not be explained rationally 
as being defined by a series of signs, images, and representations because world and 
body (and consequently brain) were of the same material. Instead, he prioritized the 
body’s action as the route from which to receive and give back to the material world. 
Bergson’s nonrepresentational position contrasts starkly with the virtual environment, 
where the world is constructed entirely from signs, images, and representations, and it 
has none of the materiality of the body. The confusion of that inconsistent materiality 
impacted on the experiences of Gribbin and me in White Island. We both chose to keep 
hold of the physical rope for the majority of the time that we wore the headset, and we 
agreed afterward that there were various reasons for our reticence to release it. First, 
it was the only method of controlling the height of the hot-air balloon in which we 
were drifting among steep mountains and valleys. While crashing was an irresistible 
temptation, it was also interesting to explore the virtual world, so we chose to maintain 
what control we could for much of the time (fig. 3). However, my choice not to let 
go was also related to an innate desire to maintain grounding in the physical world. 
The roughness of the rope in my hand and its resistance to free movement (attached 
at top and bottom) gave me a physical reference point that I found psychologically 
comforting and physically stabilizing.40 In Bergson’s terms, it permitted an exchange 
between the materiality of my body and the world. This was important to me because 
the mismatch between my proprioceptive and visual perceptions of my body caused 
me to feel unstable. When I reached out to grip the basket railing, my invisible hand 
groped about in the air, searching for the railing that I could see in front of me. This 
small action was brought to my attention sharply as I felt a momentary loss of bal-
ance caused by my subconscious anticipation of grasping the rail. Much contemporary 
philosophy defines the “real” by lived experience rather than by definitions of physical 
and virtual, yet which was more real to me—my proprioceptively present, visually 
38 Ibid., 4.
39 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1911), 5.
40 Gibson and Martelli have experimented with standing the participant on a board suspended on 
ropes to mimic the movement of the hot-air balloon basket. However, they found that this tended to 
cause debilitating sickness and disorientation. (Ruth Gibson, personal communication with the author, 
Coventry University, November 2014.)
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absent hand or the visually present, proprioceptively absent railing? Without feeling 
the roughness of the rope in my other hand, I found that I was not always certain.
In Virtual Art, his seminal book on the subject, Oliver Grau expressed concerns 
about this lack of common materiality from which to experience being in the world: 
“virtual reality stands for the complete divorce of the human sensorium from nature 
and matter.”41 The world of the immersive virtual environment is created by humans 
for humans; the human creator stands in the shoes of God, as it were, but humans 
cannot create matter. Despite the awe-inspiring nature of the Arctic that is represented, 
there is nothing that can hurt me, since the environment has no materiality to match 
my own. Precisely because of this, there are affordances that do not exist in the mate-
rial world, which is why my first impulse is to crash into a mountain. It is a space in 
which to do the undoable, to rehearse the unrehearsable. In this space we might begin 
to access alternative embodied experiences to expand our individual perspectives. 
We might begin to experience something of blindness, or travel with Syrian refugees 
across the sea, or shoot zombies in London. My body remains the center of action, as 
Bergson posits, but the consequences of those actions are disrupted by the fundamental 
difference in materiality between body and world so that I can experience these things 
without going blind, drowning, or dying.
Grau was alarmed by the challenge that VR posed to “the human senses and their 
relationship with the environment, which produces, sustains and permeates them.”42 Yet, 
it is the very fact of the body’s inescapable materiality that causes slippages between 
material and immaterial in VR, which allows the undoable to be done. It is precisely 
this doing of the undoable that Hayley explores in The Nether, where a virtual world 
called the Hideaway has been created as a place for visitors to take their avatars to 
engage in acts of pedophilia and child murder, experiencing it as if it were real. Is it 
Figure 3. Ruth Gibson and Bruno Martelli’s White Island (2013).  
(Photo: Copyright © Ruth Gibson and Bruno Martelli, reprinted with permission.)
41 Grau, Virtual Art, 231.
42 Ibid.
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a crime, the play asks, if the visitor achieves the bodily experience, but no child is 
abused or hurt? Should all undoable actions be able to be done in virtual worlds? 
The play explores this question generally, but its challenge is particularly relevant to 
theatre-makers. Theatre is used to dealing with dramatic illusion, but what happens 
if any dramatic illusion can be experienced as if it were physically real and the viewer 
is taking part in it? Hayley’s play is set in the near future, but the blurring of physical 
and virtual is already happening in our bodies.
The Blurred Body
Throughout this essay I have been using hyphenated terms such as “absent-present” 
to indicate more than just the apparent duality of experience of being both visually 
absent and proprioceptively present at the same time. There is an inevitable blurring 
of modalities of knowledge when visual and proprioceptive sensory perceptions do 
not correspond; body schema and body image are misaligned and phenomena appear 
familiar yet confusing, uncanny. The physical and the metaphysical have long been 
bracketed off to support the Western dualism of body/mind and subsequently physical/
virtual. The knowledge stemming from these modalities builds limited subjectivities 
from fixed perspectives, constructing static frames of reference.43 But the nature of my 
experience in White Island was neither bodily nor metabodily anchored; instead, it was 
shifting and slipping, simultaneously both and neither. Rather than the experience of 
a doubled subject, such as body/avatar relationships in which body and avatar are 
experienced as connected though in separate spaces, this was the experience of a single 
subject with blurring boundaries and definitions.
Physical/virtual is not the only binary to become indistinct in the blurred body. 
Sensory perceptions and bodily memories are also deeply implicated. Bergson argued 
that “the zone of indetermination” surrounds every living being, with its amplitude 
depending on the relations of that being to other things.44 These relations are manifested 
in memory, “impregnated with our past.” Bergson asserted that this indetermination 
“constitutes the principal share of individual consciousness” in our perception. It pro-
vides complexity to the otherwise simple immediacy of direct contact, as in the percep-
tion of lower-level organisms. Gilles Deleuze takes this idea further to propose humans 
as “living matter or centres of indetermination” where subject and object coincide.45 
In these centers, there is in-between-ness where conceptual dialectics dissolve—for 
example, physical/virtual, visible/invisible. Nicolas Salazar Sutil applies this concept 
to the philosophy of movement: “It is only by being in between that the knowledge 
of both subject and object, of both here and there, of self and other, of myself and that 
which is not myself can be integrated.”46 I carry with me all my experiences of being a 
material body in the material world, and of taking action in that world. As a center of 
indeterminacy, my perception is impregnated with embodied, kinetic memories from 
a lifetime of physical action.47 Bergson referred to this as “bodily memory,” which he 
43 Nicolas Salazar Sutil and Sita Popat, eds., Digital Movement: Essays in Motion Technology and Per-
formance (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 5.
44 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 23–25.
45 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 65.
46 Nicolas Salazar Sutil, Motion and Representation: The Language of Human Movement (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2015), 237.
47 See Sklar, “Remembering Kinesthesia.”
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described as a “quasi-instantaneous memory” consisting of “the sum of the sensori-
motor systems organized by habit.”48
In White Island, my embodied or “bodily” memories collided with the conceptual 
understanding that the virtual world was not actual and I could not have physical 
contact with it. It was from the in-between-ness of these memories and concepts, this 
center of indeterminacy, that I perceived the virtual environment. My blurred body 
existed between the definable points of physical and virtual and so enabled them to 
be permeable, to intersect, in my embodied experience. This allowed me to do the 
undoable by drawing on and extrapolating from bodily memories in order to color 
my interactions with the virtual world. Returning to my earlier reference to Schech-
ner’s modeling of the stage actor, the body’s experience of the virtual environment is 
“not-not-real.” The behavior of the virtual environment in relation to the body is not 
the same as that of the physical environment. However, the embodied subject expe-
riences some of the same sensations and responses that it would do in the physical 
environment because, as a center of indeterminacy, it is embedded with the memories 
of a lifetime’s relationship with the physical world. In White Island I experienced the 
act of crashing into the virtual mountainside as not being not-real. I referred earlier to 
Sheets-Johnstone’s assertion that the tactile-kinesthetic body “cannot be fooled.” My 
body was not fooled, but my perception of the virtual experience was deeply informed 
by my embodied knowledge of being in the world. Bergson described how actions 
exist independently from the type of information received about an object: “It seems 
that the movement of my body in order to reach and to modify an object is the same, 
whether I have been told of its existence by the ear or whether it has been revealed 
to me by sight or touch. My motor activity thus appears as a separate entity, a sort 
of reservoir whence movements issue at will, always the same for the same action.”49
Regardless of how we process or give hierarchies to experiential and conceptual 
information or physical and virtual objects, the action of reaching out toward an object 
retains the same fundamental proprioceptive experience at its core. It is this that allows 
us to experience interactions with the virtual world as not-being-not-real and thus to 
do the undoable, rehearse the unrehearsable, to begin to feel a little of what it might be 
like to be in a war zone in the desert, to fight zombies, to be blind. When there is only 
one person in the virtual world, as in White Island or Notes on Blindness, the designer of 
that world need be concerned only with that person’s experience, as in a one-on-one 
performance. However, when multiple people are in a virtual world together, as in 
Desert Rain, the interaction among them has to be taken into consideration as part of 
the experience and the design becomes more complex, as any creator of participatory 
performances will know. Part of that complexity comes from the subtle and unsubtle 
ways that participants interact with one another within the performance.
Virtually Touching
Digital performance practitioner and academic Steve Dixon has observed that 
people in telematic spaces (remotely located while visually represented in a shared 
virtual environment) will often attempt to touch one another far more quickly and 
intimately than they would normally do if they met in physical space.50 Telematics 
48 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 197.
49 Ibid., 41 (emphasis added).
50 Steve Dixon, keynote presentation on November 2, 2008, at the Post Me_New ID Forum, Hellerau, 
Germany.
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uses direct visual representations of participants as their avatars, so onscreen I see a 
visual image of my own body reaching out toward a visual image of someone else’s 
body. If the image of my hand touches the image of the other person, then we appear 
to make contact. Telematic artist Paul Sermon describes this as “touching with my 
eyes,”51 as the visual feedback informs both of us that the touch has occurred in the 
virtual world, even though the other person and I might be many miles distant in the 
physical world. Dixon and Sermon collaborated with Mathias Fuchs and Andrea Zapp 
in 2005 to create the telematic performance Unheimlich (2005) in which participants 
on a blue-screen stage in a studio theatre in Rhode Island interacted in real time with 
actors in a blue-screen studio in Salford, England52 (fig. 4).
A camera filmed each blue-screen area, and the images of participants and actors 
were overlaid, with a layer of background images, so that they all appeared to be in 
the same space. The composite image was projected back into each space so that they 
could see themselves together in that space as they performed. Verbal communica-
tion was also possible between the two spaces. Dixon’s comments about the desire for 
touch were evidenced clearly in the repeated attempts to touch the remote “Other” in 
this improvised performance. Almost immediately, individuals attempted to put an 
arm around someone in the other location, to help someone up off the floor, to stroke 
someone’s hair. The fact that one cannot make contact with the flesh of the other 
person in the virtual environment seems to suspend some of the social prohibitions 
associated with physically touching the bodies of relative strangers in Western cultures. 
Instead, VR affords, even invites experimentation with the doing of the culturally or 
physically undoable through the suspension of “real”-world sociocultural norms and 
rules. The critical factor is that the undoable remains undoable: you both know that 
the touch will not occur in any physical sense, even though you enact touching and 
perhaps also being touched. So the norms can be safely suspended by (usually tacit) 
agreement among participants. Yet, the affordance is offered to experiment with the 
doing of action, which draws on proprioceptive memories to inform the experience, 
thus providing at least partial access to embodied knowledge of this particular act, 
which might otherwise remain unknowable. The process enables the body to experi-
ence something of the physical anticipation of the culmination of the act, as can be 
seen in my physical responses to crashing into the virtual mountainside (raised pulse, 
mild adrenalin rush, the urge to brace myself against a physical impact that will never 
occur). Thus the norms are not quite suspended because the individual is engaged in 
the embodied experience of doing the action, even if conceptually she knows that the 
act can never be completed as it would in the physical environment.
Touch is particularly important in participatory virtual worlds, partly because of 
the intriguing playfulness of disrupting sociocultural norms, but also as part of a 
fundamental negotiation of the body’s flesh in a virtual world. Susan Kozel explains 
that “digitally mediated communications can be construed as processes of connecting, 
intents to achieve proximity, and attempts at touching, rather than the accomplished 
states of communication, proximity and touch.”53 Attempts to touch are manifested 
in the processes of reaching out toward other participants.54 The reach demonstrates 
51 See Paul Sermon’s website, available at http://www.paulsermon.org.
52 See the Unheimlich website, available at http://www.paulsermon.org/unheimlich/.
53 Kozel, Closer, 142.
54 Nicolas Salazar Sutil, Matthew Sansom, and Paul Krause, Reach (digital performance and presenta-
tion) at the Ivy Arts Centre, University of Surrey, September 4, 2013.
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the desire for bodily connection that seems to be a key part of negotiating co-presence 
with someone else. Many of Sermon’s telematic artworks do not include the option to 
talk to other participants, and so physical gesture and movement become the primary 
modes of communication. However, even though verbal communication is prominent 
in Unheimlich, touch is obviously important for most participants. In contemporary 
society, we are accustomed to speaking with people remotely via the telephone, but 
the attempts to touch in VR seem to indicate that we feel almost close enough to reach 
one another. Visual proximity seems to engender the desire for corporeal exchange, 
perhaps as a way to create a virtual sharing of corporeal space. Our bodies may ap-
pear to be missing, but the enaction of touch constitutes evidence of a shared presence.
Returning to Bergson’s proposition, motor activity (kinesthesia), tactility, and the 
other proprioceptive senses seem to sit outside the binaries of conceptual/experiential, 
or in this case virtual/physical, enabling a blurring in-between-ness where embod-
ied experience exists without recourse to those static perspectives. Just as embodied 
memories can color virtual experiences, so also can touch carry some connotations into 
the virtual world. Anne Cranny-Francis describes physical world interactions in which 
“uninvited or unexpected touch may be regarded as crude, ill-mannered, presumptuous 
or even criminal,” and unintended touch, for example on a crowded train, is usually 
followed by an apology or ignored “as if the touch—and therefore connection—has 
Figure 4. Unheimlich (2005) by Steve Dixon, Mathias Fuchs, Paul Sermon, and Andrea Zapp, 
performed by Anna Fenemore and Niki Woods. (Photo: Steve Dixon, reprinted with permission.)
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not occurred.”55 Connection and touch are critically entwined for Cranny-Francis. She 
explains that “[o]ne cannot not touch, so one is always connected to the world—to 
other people, species, objects, phenomena.”56
But in a virtual environment the experience is the opposite: the user cannot touch 
the virtual objects, people, and phenomena, although she can touch her own body and 
the physical objects around it (which may not be visible in the virtual environment). 
Therefore the everyday physical connection of touching is partially missing, and the 
constitution of self in relation to others is disrupted. In this situation, reaching out to 
another person in a virtual environment invites the opportunity for my body as flesh, 
represented by a digital avatar, to cause the other person’s body as flesh, represented 
by a digital avatar, to be born in the virtual environment. If the person accepts my 
reach by enacting being touched, then we both have presence in that environment 
together, and our physical/virtual flesh is constituted through the connection that 
is made between us. However, it is still possible to touch by accident. For example, 
when negotiating the position of your image in a shared telematic space, it is easy to 
step the wrong way and visually “bump into” other people, as can be seen at times in 
Unheimlich.57 Indeed, the act of touching can still be perceived as “crude, ill-mannered 
or presumptuous,” since reaching out to touch carries with it some of the sociocultural 
values implicit in the intended touch.
The partial suspension of sociocultural rules and expectations that I have noted in 
relation to VR is also relevant to immersive theatre, but the emphasis is a little different. 
In Immersive Theatres Josephine Machon explains that these environments exist outside 
“of ‘everyday’ rules and regulations.”58 In Punchdrunk’s immersive performance The 
Drowned Man: A Hollywood Fable (2013) in the vast, disused Royal Mail sorting office 
in West London, we were given some rules in advance, such as the requirement to 
wear a mask at all times, except in the bar. Some rules we learned, such as the fact 
that the majority of performers did not respond to audience members most of the 
time, but simply carried on doing their tasks or staring into space. However, unlike 
VR, the proximity of physical bodies implied an inherent awareness of risk and a 
corresponding duty of care between performers and audience members, and among 
audience members. A group of audience members chasing headlong after a performer 
paused to allow an elderly lady to negotiate the stairs in the opposite direction. In 
immersive theatres, some sociocultural rules can be twisted or broken by permission 
from the environment and performers, but there is another level of ethical rules that 
are governed by empathic responses, and these seem more difficult to break.
Physical body-to-body encounters carry a set of sociocultural expectations and laws 
that are fundamental to co-presence, even if immersive theatre might not impose “’ev-
eryday’ rules and regulations.” A recent increase in studies of empathy stems largely 
from neuroscience’s influence on wider discourses about the body and self. These 
studies acknowledge the deep-seated human tendency to recognize and respond to 
55 Anne Cranny-Francis, Technology and Touch: The Biopolitics of Emerging Technologies (Basingstoke, 
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 20.
56 Ibid.
57 See the Unheimlich documentation movie at http://www.paulsermon.org/unheimlich/downloads.htm.
58 Machon, Immersive Theatres, 27.
376 / Sita Popat
the perceived experiences and emotions of others.59 As Elaine Scarry explains: “having 
a body means having sentience and the capacity to sense the sentience of others.”60 
Awareness of the sentience of others tends to be affective, according to Dee Reynolds’s 
research on kinesthetic empathy: “In terms of embodiment, affect refers to that point 
at which the body is activated, ‘excited,’ in the process of responding; but this process 
has not yet reached consciousness to the extent of producing cognitive awareness that 
can be translated into language.”61
The precognitive nature of affective empathic response makes it difficult to counter 
because it is hard-wired into the body and usually underscored by norms and rules of 
sociocultural behavior instilled from birth. We can learn to counter those sociocultural 
rules that are cognitively understood, even if some might evoke embodied responses 
(such as peeping through a gap at a woman getting undressed in The Drowned Man). 
But it is harder to transgress those norms that place the bodies of others and ourselves 
at risk of what we perceive to be genuine discomfort, pain, or distress. The virtual 
nature of theatre reduces the perception of some types of discomfort or distress being 
experienced as genuine (they may be acted), and it can even give permission, in some 
cases, for levels of genuine discomfort by means of performance. However, the line is 
drawn somewhere for each audience member and performer. The engagement among 
human bodies has ethical implications, transmitted through a sense of empathy and 
affinity, aligned with deeply embedded cultural norms at a precognitive level. This is 
an ethics of embodiment that is almost impossible to bypass as a human body among 
other bodies, even in theatre. But what happens if the body is missing?
Towards an Ethics of Embodiment
Virtual reality engages the body at an experiential level, blurring physical/virtual 
distinctions through proprioceptive senses, corporeal space, and bodily memory. This 
engagement bridges the differences between the materialities of body and environment, 
enabling me to feel physical responses to crashing into the virtual cliff. When I reach 
out to touch someone in a shared telematic environment, I know that her body exists 
somewhere, and I feel a sense of connection if she acknowledges my virtual touch. 
But I can punch that person’s virtual image as hard as I like and it will not hurt her, 
although my action might cause social tension between us.
In Sermon’s 1994 version of Telematic Dreaming, performer Susan Kozel’s live telematic 
video image was projected onto a bed in a gallery installation, and visitors to the gal-
lery could interact with her via her virtual body on the bed. Kozel described how she 
was violently attacked by two male visitors to the gallery, even though such action was 
not invited or suggested by the artwork or environment.62 She was shocked though 
unhurt as the act was carried out on her projected image, while her physical body 
lay in another room. Participants in both VR and telematic environments may bind 
59 See, for example, Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens; and Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes 
the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
60 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 233.
61 Dee Reynolds, “Kinesthetic Empathy and the Dance’s Body: From Emotion to Affect,” in Kines-
thetic Empathy in Creative and Cultural Practices, ed. Dee Reynolds and Matthew Reason (Bristol, UK: 
Intellect, 2013), 124.
62 Kozel, Closer, 98.
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together physical/virtual in embodied experience, yet virtual bodies have no physi-
cal presence and are perceived by others as feeling neither pain nor ecstasy. Indeed, 
Kozel reported that she felt complete withdrawal of her physical embodiment from 
her separate virtual body during the attack—perhaps because of the shock, or perhaps 
because the physical violence was beyond her bodily comprehension—although she 
was still shaken and disturbed by the experience.
There is no implicit ethical response in interactions with virtual bodies, as the image 
feels no pain and there are currently no laws that Kozel could bring into force against 
the perpetrators for that action. Human bodies do not necessarily experience the same 
fundamental levels of empathy or affinity with the image of a body as they might with 
a fleshy body. Consequently, the interactions between virtually represented bodies may 
be governed by sociocultural norms and rules, but they are not necessarily subject to 
the precognitive ethics of embodiment in the manner of physical body interactions. 
Yet, as this essay has explained, the embodied experience of immersive VR can be 
not-not-real, and so acts done to the virtual body can be experienced as being shades 
of the physical experience, affecting the body physically as well as emotionally. Kozel 
may have withdrawn completely from her separate telematic image, but in immersive 
VR my adrenalin levels rose and pulse raced before the crash in White Island. In shared 
telematic environments there is a disjuncture between the embodied experience of 
the virtual body and the perception of that body by an “Other.” It is only a matter of 
time before fully immersive VR is experienced regularly as a shared space with other 
people, with embodied experience enhanced accordingly.
Virtual worlds offer unlimited possibilities to experiment with the undoable, 
to rehearse the unrehearsable, to expand our understandings and experiences of other 
people, situations, and environments. Yet, where does one draw the line if there is no 
implicit ethics of embodiment in shared bodily presence? How should we encounter 
others ethically in virtual worlds, given that the embodied experience of virtual bod-
ies can be not-not-real? The problem is not one of disembodiment, as so many earlier 
assumptions about VR suggest; instead, as I have suggested here, the problem is in the 
proprioceptive mismatch between the embodied experience of self and the perception 
of the disembodied “Other”—an ethical asymmetry. In both solo and shared virtual 
worlds, this ethical concern is fundamental to the design of the experience, but in 
shared worlds it is also about how individuals behave toward one other.
In computer gaming there has been a prevalence of war games with separate avatars 
on desktop screens. If these games persist into the new wave of immersive VR (as they 
will) and we experience some level of embodiment, then what are the possible psy-
chological impacts of such games? In computer games there is little sense-making of 
embodied experience, since the emphasis is on the achievement of targets, or on staying 
“alive” in game. Theatre may not necessarily offer much to VR in terms of storytelling, 
but it can provide an understanding of what it means to be present with someone or 
something else. The desire of telematic performance participants to touch or reconnect 
with what is perceived to be missing in telematic and virtual environments suggests the 
potential for a new ethics of embodiment that recognizes the virtual “Other” as being 
connected to the physical “Other.” However, it requires further practical exploration 
to see how different forms and modes of touching objects and people establish both 
individual and co-presence. Eventually, remote interaction in VR is likely to become 
as familiar as using a mobile, but for the moment there are questions to be asked that 
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theatre is well-suited to answer, and indeed it is perhaps the only place where such 
questions can be asked effectively.
As VR headsets become more widely accessible, they will be used more exten-
sively in the arts and entertainment industries, as well as in education and training, 
healthcare and medical rehabilitation, and many other contexts. How far will artists 
and audiences wish to push the ethics of embodiment in immersive VR encounters? 
And what will be the consequences? Artworks that give us perspectives on the lives 
of other people can reveal a great deal about human experience, as in We Wait, Notes 
on Blindness, and VR immersive journalism. However, as the pedophile’s virtual realm 
in Hayley’s The Nether shows, there is an inherent moral dilemma in VR’s embodied 
experience of presence/absence, combined with the ability to do the undoable, which 
could be taken to extremes alarmingly quickly and easily. As VR inevitably becomes 
more prevalent in theatre, it will be important for artists and performers to keep in 
mind both the differences and similarities between physical and virtual bodies, together 
with the experiences they share. It will take a while for audiences to develop ethical 
awareness of virtual bodies as both perceived and experienced, as computer games 
will not necessarily take account of such concerns in the face of commercialization. 
Ethical awareness will need to be actively considered when designing and reviewing 
theatrical experiences incorporating VR.
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